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GROUNDING ORIGINALISM 
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs 
ABSTRACT—How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” 
in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation 
of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual 
practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of 
originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the 
Founding, plus all lawful changes made since. 
Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. 
How can practice solve our problems, when there are so many theories of 
law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official story, when 
on-the-ground practice may be confused or divided—or may even make the 
story ring false? And why take originalism as the official story, when so 
many scholars and judges seem to reject it? 
This Essay offers a response to each. To the extent that legal systems 
are features of particular societies, a useful theory will have to pay attention 
to actual social practice, including the aspects of legal practice we describe. 
This positive focus really can resolve a great many contentious legal 
disputes, as shared legal premises lead to conclusions that might surprise us 
or that ultimately establish one side in a dispute as correct. The most serious 
challenge to our view is the empirical one: whether originalism is or isn’t the 
official story of our law. Stripped of their jurisprudential confusion, though, 
the best competing accounts of our law seem to have far less supporting 
evidence than our own account. Focusing on social practice as it stands today 
turns out to direct our attention to the Founders and to the changes over time 
that their law has recognized. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“What makes a method of legal interpretation correct?”1 The question 
is an urgent one. Americans disagree about their Constitution and about how 
to interpret it. But perhaps we can make forward progress if we first push the 
debate back a step or two. If people disagree about interpretation, and if they 
make earnest arguments on either side, maybe they can still reach agreement 
on something prior (and thus far neglected)2: what might make their 
 
 1 Mark Greenberg, Response, What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal 
Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 105, 105 (2017). 
 2 See Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1115, 1136 (2012) (decrying this neglect). One important exception is Christopher R. Green, 
Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 497 (2018). For others, see 
Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325 (2018); Mitchell N. Berman 
& Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 545 (2013); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 
535 (1999); and David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 
(1996). 
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arguments good arguments? What would make an interpretive method 
correct? 
Over the past several years, we’ve sought to articulate a view of 
American law that responds to this question, as well as to specific 
interpretive debates. That view contains three core claims. 
1. Theories of legal interpretation ought to give more emphasis to 
questions of law.3 Whatever a theory’s conceptual elegance or normative 
attractions, it also matters whether that theory already reflects our law or is 
instead a call for law reform. What our law makes of a legal text is a legal 
question, and it deserves a legal answer. That answer depends in part on 
principles of abstract jurisprudence, which determine the law in general, and 
in part on particular rules of our legal system, which determine the effect of 
particular instruments (whether contracts, statutes, or constitutions). Those 
particular rules might be legally binding, even if they’re not the best possible 
rules. So our deepest disputes about interpretive theory, just like our disputes 
about tax rates or drug policy, might turn out to have particular answers in 
our legal system, even if the best answers remain a matter of dispute. 
2. As it turns out, the particular rules of our legal system happen to 
endorse a form of originalism.4 Our law today incorporates our original law 
by reference. Officially, we treat the Constitution as a piece of enacted law 
that was adopted a long time ago; whatever law it made back then remains 
the law, subject to various de jure alterations or amendments made since.5 
And we identify modern law by way of this past law, the way a nemo dat 
rule identifies today’s property holdings by way of yesterday’s transfers: 
explaining how a legal rule enjoys good title today means explaining how it 
lawfully arose out of the government established at the Founding.6 This 
“original-law originalism”7 is broad and inclusive, in that it serves as a 
criterion for the rest of our constitutional law, “including of the validity of 
other methods of interpretation or decision.”8 
To be sure, government officials don’t always satisfy this criterion, any 
more than ordinary citizens always comply with laws against murder or tax 
 
 3 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 
(2017). For a related view, see Mark Greenberg, Principles of Legal Interpretation 9, 17–20 (2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Principles-of-Legal-
Interpretation-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT75-NK4S]. 
 4 We’ve also made analogous arguments about statutory interpretation, which we won’t rehearse at 
length here. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1097–1118, 1121–28. 
 5 Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 
849–52 (2015). 
 6 Id. at 846–47. 
 7 Id. at 874. 
 8 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355 (2015). 
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evasion. But in conceding that—and in calling originalism the “official 
story” of the legal system9—we also don’t mean to portray it as a fable 
recited at judicial campfires and then ignored when the real work gets done. 
Rather, we think that our legal system reflects a deep commitment to our 
original law, publicly displayed in our legal practice. Indeed, originalism 
could aptly be called the “deep structure” of our constitutional law, present 
in our frequent practices of identifying, justifying, and debating the content 
of our law.10 
3. The binding force of our original law has important consequences for 
the present day. In principle, the Founders’ law might have allowed for just 
about anything. It might have endorsed many different methods of 
interpretation or rules of legal change—from hyper-literal strict construction 
to the “equity of the statute,”11 from Article V amendments to evolving 
bodies of customary law. But to claim that, in fact, our original law actually 
permits or requires any of these things is to make an empirical and falsifiable 
claim, one that has to be supported by historical evidence and not only by 
modern policy preferences. The original-law approach may be capacious in 
theory, but it’s “exacting in application.”12 
If we’re right about these three claims, much else follows. As a 
theoretical matter, if the interpreter’s job is to ask what our law is (and to 
leave to others what it should be), then many of our interpretive and 
normative disputes are reframed. And as a practical matter, this 
understanding of American constitutional law might turn out to support or to 
undermine a wide variety of legal doctrines.13 
But not everybody agrees we’re right. Indeed, not everybody agrees 
we’re even asking the right questions, or proceeding down the right track. 
Some scholars worry that we’ve overrun our foundations—arguing that our 
claims can’t be adjudicated until we first identify the proper theory of law, 
because “prominent theories of law have extremely different implications for 
legal interpretation.”14 To others, our situation is even worse: we “achieve[] 
 
 9 Sachs, supra note 5, at 870. 
 10 Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice 27, 
80 (Apr. 11, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/id=2940215 [https://perma.cc/PC2D-
TDWD]. 
 11 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 995–96 (2001). 
 12 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103, 104 (2016). 
 13 See, e.g., id. at 107–08 (listing decisions whose legal pedigree is doubtful under original law 
originalism); Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2017) (arguing, 
naturally, that Pennoyer was right). See generally William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the 
Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017) (defending modern doctrines of state sovereign immunity). 
 14 Greenberg, supra note 1, at 117–18. 
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an air of novelty and plausibility only because [we’re] ambiguous, evasive, 
or downright inconsistent about some of the deepest questions about the 
nature of law,” and no theory of law can save us.15 Any turn to positive law, 
this argument goes, “puts judges and legal scholars right back where they 
have always been,”16 making no forward progress in resolving our 
disagreements. And still others simply disagree with our reading of the 
evidence, finding it unconvincing that originalism is the official story of 
today’s law.17 
It’s true that at least some of our claims involve theoretical assumptions 
about what law is and how it works. Thus far, we’ve generally worked from 
the conventional assumption that “what counts as law in any society is 
fundamentally a matter of social fact.”18 In our view, this positivist premise 
fits within an overlapping consensus among American legal scholars, largely 
centered on the theories of Professor H.L.A. Hart19—a consensus that 
appeals to the broadest possible audience without requiring too many 
controversial assumptions. (We also think it has the further virtue of being 
true.) But we haven’t yet attempted to defend positivism writ large or to rest 
our theory on any particular version thereof. 
We offer three arguments here that we hope will show that our theory 
is as grounded as it needs to be.20 First, we argue that one can make real 
progress in legal interpretation by looking to legal practice, without first 
resolving many difficult jurisprudential questions. Second, we argue that this 
kind of positive focus can in fact resolve a great many contentious legal 
disputes. Rather than leaving legal disputants “where they have always 
been,”21 our shared practice often reveals shared legal premises that lead to 
surprising results or that ultimately establish one side in a dispute as correct. 
Third, we argue that the most serious challenge to our view ought to be an 
empirical one: whether originalism is or isn’t the official story of our law. 
Stripped of their jurisprudential confusions, the challenges to our empirical 
 
 15 Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1330, 1342 (2017). 
 16 Id. at 1387. 
 17 See infra Part III. 
 18 Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S 
POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355, 356 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001). 
 19 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012); see also infra Section II.A (describing 
Hart’s theory); cf. Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1298 n.23 
(2014) (describing “Hart’s version of legal positivism” as “the most influential position in contemporary 
philosophy of law”). 
 20 We use the term “ground” for its colloquial meaning, rather than in any technical sense. See, e.g., 
Ricki Bliss & Kelly Trogdon, Metaphysical Grounding, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/grounding 
[https://perma.cc/S9DN-CN58] (discussing the technical notion of grounding). 
 21 Barzun, supra note 15, at 1387. 
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claims remain weak. Many lawyers might find themselves surprised to be 
committed to originalist premises, the way Molière’s M. Jourdain was 
amazed to discover that he had spent his whole life speaking prose. Yet 
competing accounts of the law prove to be even harder to swallow. 
The result, we hope, is a straightforward grounding of originalism as 
our law—then and now. 
 THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Interpretive theory doesn’t live in a vacuum. To paraphrase Professor 
Mark Greenberg, “an account of legal interpretation” ought to be 
“responsible to a theory of law.”22 Interpreting a legal text is just one part of 
how we identify the law in general. And identifying the law, in our view, 
means looking to actual legal practice. 
The legal content of a particular text—its contribution to the legal 
system, to use Greenberg’s term23—can depend not only on its linguistic 
content but also on existing legal rules.24 A statute creating a new criminal 
offense, for example, might be understood and interpreted according to a 
variety of special-purpose rules, such as the Dictionary Act,25 the repeal-
revival statute,26 or the mens rea canon.27 These legal rules can guide the 
interpretation of a legal text that “outranks” them: old statutes help determine 
the effect of new ones, and common law doctrines help determine the content 
of statutes.28 
The same interpretive issues arise for constitutions, and the same kinds 
of rules can help solve them. Does an amendment repealing Prohibition abate 
pending bootlegging prosecutions? Unwritten legal rules tell us that the 
answer is yes.29 And similar rules can tell us, for instance, the “burden of 
proof for constitutional questions,” “the authority of constitutional 
precedents,” and even which scraps of text form part of our authoritative 
constitutional document.30 The substance of our interpretive rules may differ 
 
 22 Greenberg, supra note 3, at 9. 
 23 Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic 
Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 219 (Andrei Marmor 
& Scott Soames eds., 2011). 
 24 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1082. 
 25 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 26 Id. § 108. 
 27 See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 574–75 (2009). 
 28 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1097–99. 
 29 See id. at 1118–20 (discussing United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1934)). 
 30 Id. at 1120; see also John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 375, 429–51 (2001) (arguing that the validity of the Fourteenth Amendment relies, in part, on the 
de facto government doctrine). 
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for statutes and for constitutions,31 but they’re the same kinds of rules, 
answering the same kinds of questions. Even if one accepts no other part of 
our project, we believe these claims are both useful and correct, supported 
by well-recognized features of modern law. 
The most fundamental challenge to our project disputes the usefulness 
of even these claims. Greenberg, for example, agrees that “what makes a 
method of legal interpretation correct is that it accurately identifies the 
law.”32 But he sees it as a mistake to analogize such methods too closely to 
particular legal standards like the mens rea canon, because the “answers to 
questions about legal interpretation depend,” in the final accounting, “on 
how the content of the law is determined at a more fundamental level than 
legal standards.”33 The mens rea canon is only law because something else 
makes it so. Because intermediate standards like these play only “a 
subsidiary role in the full explanation of how the content of the law is 
determined,” focusing the interpretive inquiry on them “only pushes back a 
step the core question of how the more basic facts determine legal 
standards.”34 
Yet pushing questions back a step can still be useful. If one wants to 
know how plants grow, it’s often best to defer questions about fundamental 
determinants (like particle physics or quantum mechanics) and to work at the 
intermediate level of proteins and enzymes instead. That’s because proteins 
and enzymes are the means by which the fundamental determinants go about 
determining things; learning about them tells us something that’s useful to 
know, even when we’re mistaken on the fundamentals. Scientists learned a 
great deal about macro-scale chemistry while working from incorrect beliefs 
about “phlogiston” and “dephlogisticated air,” and what they learned still 
proved relevant after the identification of oxygen.35 
Likewise, theorists who disagree about deep theory might well make 
substantial progress in legal interpretation by working at the intermediate 
level of canons or common law rules. Many arguments over the role of 
legislative history in interpreting statutes have direct analogues to the use of 
extrinsic evidence in interpreting contracts.36 It seems to be common ground 
 
 31 Cf. M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (denying that the Constitution can 
“partake of the prolixity of a legal code”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 519, 565–66 (2003) (noting that different Founding-era rules of construction applied to 
different types of documents). 
 32 Greenberg, supra note 1, at 106. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Leslie V. Woodcock, Phlogiston Theory and Chemical Revolutions, 30 BULL. FOR HIST. 
CHEM. 63, 64–65 (2005). 
 36 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1112–14. 
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that the latter question can be regulated by law;37 so why shouldn’t we 
investigate the former as a legal question, too, and see what, if anything, the 
legal system has to say about it? Without having solved jurisprudence, we 
can enjoy some degree of confidence that a new criminal statute will require 
mens rea, that it will be subject to defenses like duress or diplomatic 
immunity, and so on—whether or not individual members of the enacting 
Congress actually adverted to these issues, and whether or not the statutory 
text has any linguistic connection to these more detailed rules. The same goes 
for less obvious but still familiar aspects of our legal experience: say, that 
Congress is presumed (contrary to fact) to understand the entire corpus 
juris,38 that legal texts can be meaningful even when their actual authors 
failed to agree,39 and so on. We can have confidence that our legal system 
involves some degree of idealization in assessing communicative intent, 
without either rejecting strict intentionalism as a theory of meaning or having 
already established the fundamental determinants of law.40 And if these 
aspects of interpretation appear to be law-governed, that gives us reason to 
ask whether yet broader issues—textualism and purposivism, originalism 
and common law constitutionalism, and so on—might be law-governed as 
well. 
Now maybe all this confidence is misplaced. Greenberg argues that we 
can’t bracket disagreements over the fundamentals, even temporarily: 
different theories of law could have “extremely different implications” for 
interpretation,41 and one can’t assume that “whatever contemporary lawyers 
do is, for that reason, correct.”42 Yet a good theory of law ought to generate 
most of the familiar aspects of the existing legal system, or else it ought to 
be especially plausible in explaining why those familiar aspects are wrong. 
All else being equal, a theory suggesting that arson is lawful but that 
sandwiches are felonies would be a dubious theory of American law. 
Of course, legal claims often being defeasible, it’s possible for these 
confident assumptions to be wrong. Maybe the arson statute actually lapsed 
long ago, due to a little-noticed sunset clause hiding someplace else in the 
code. In that case, the statute book might really declare that arson isn’t a 
felony after all, and a good legal theory might tell us so. But this discovery 
 
 37 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); id. § 213 cmt. a. 
 38 See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 39 Compare, e.g., Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 
542 (2013) (holding such texts to be “gibberish”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 20, 
201 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (occasionally giving them legal effect). 
 40 Contra Greenberg, supra note 1, at 121. 
 41 Id. at 117–19 (suggesting differences in “how much law of interpretation there is and [in] what it 
requires”). 
 42 Id. at 121. 
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would undermine our surface-level commitments about arson only because 
we already share a deeper commitment about the statute book, reflecting our 
legal system’s hierarchical structure.43 Subject to those kinds of 
qualifications, it seems hard to deny that doctrines like the repeal-revival rule 
or the mens rea canon are part of American law—and that the burden is on 
anyone who’d reject the application of similar doctrines to new legal texts. 
For the same reason, if originalism or common law constitutionalism offers 
the best account of our legal system’s deep structure, that strikes us as a 
compelling argument in its favor. 
Perhaps this is just another way of stating our positivist intuitions. The 
thing to be explained strikes us as a feature of our society, and so it seems 
fair to “[l]ook and see” what our society’s practices actually are.44 Indeed, 
one needn’t be a positivist to see social practices as “crucial, even if they are 
not sufficient,” in determining the law.45 In any case, if someone wants to 
argue that positivism is generally false, then they’re hunting for bigger game 
than us. That American law reflects American legal practice, all else being 
equal, is an assumption we’re willing to make. (That’s why we see the 
surprising features of our own account as strikes against it, all else being 
equal, and thus as needing further explanation.) 
We’re also willing to make certain assumptions regarding the types of 
positivism that might support the project. In our own work, we’ve adopted 
the generally Hartian version of positivism,46 described further below,47 that 
strikes us as the focal point among American law professors (to the extent 
that they think about such theories at all).48 It might turn out that the Hartian 
account is generally wrong and that some contrary positivist theory—say, 
that of Professor Joseph Raz or of Professor Scott Shapiro—is generally 
right.49 That, too, is bigger game; and to the extent that those theories are 
truly general, capable of representing any positive legal system regardless of 
its content, then they ought to be no less mindful of the social commitments 
and interpretive practices we describe. (There could be Razian or 
Shapironian versions of original-law originalism, the construction of which 
 
 43 See infra Part II. 
 44 Leslie Green, Introduction to HART, supra note 19, at xlv. 
 45 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 116 (2016); 
see also Mikołaj Barczentewicz, The Limits of Natural Law Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
ONLINE 115, 124–25 (2018) (noting this argument by Pojanowski and Walsh). 
 46 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1116; see also HART, supra note 19 (setting forth this view). 
 47 See infra Section II.A. 
 48 See Greenberg, supra note 19, at 1298 n.23. 
 49 Cf. Barzun, supra note 15, at 1361–80 (discussing the theories of Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and 
Morality, 68 MONIST 295 (1985), and SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011)). 
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we leave as an exercise for the reader.50) For present purposes, we’re satisfied 
to show that our account of the law is generally consistent with the most-
accepted theory of positivism. If we’re right about the theory and right about 
the practice, then originalism is rather well-grounded indeed. 
 THEORY  
To some, using practice to resolve real-life legal disputes is a fool’s 
errand. Positivism grounds law in social practice and consensus, and if 
people disagree, it seems that consensus has run short. According to 
Professor Richard Primus, an argument for originalism “cannot simply 
emerge from pointing to our present practices,” for the simple reason that 
originalism “calls for those practices to change.”51 As he argues, “[i]t is what 
the Court has been doing that is our law, and a big part of what the Court has 
been doing is deciding cases . . . in ways that are not consistent with original 
meanings.”52 More emphatically, to Professor Charles Barzun, “no defender 
of any controversial theory of legal interpretation can appeal to Hartian 
positivism for support,” for Hartian positivism requires a “consensus or near-
consensus” to ground any claim about law.53 On this objection, if the official 
story and official practice are at loggerheads, the story tells us nothing new 
or useful about the law. 
This kind of criticism moves too fast. Positivism might ground law on 
social practice, but it doesn’t reduce law to social practice. On Hart’s own 
account, some legal rules might reflect practice directly, but the vast majority 
do so only indirectly, involving some degree of inference from practice-
supported premises.54 Individual results are derived from legal rules, which 
are derived, in turn, from yet more fundamental legal rules—terminating, on 
 
 50 For example, Raz’s claim that social facts alone identify the “existence and content” of the law, 
see Raz, supra note 49, at 296, is in no way inconsistent with those social facts cross-referring us in 
certain ways to the law of the Founding, itself identified by yet more social facts. Barzun, improbably, 
denies this, on the ground that the Founders might have wished to incorporate moral principles in their 
law in a way that Raz’s “sources thesis” forbids. See Barzun, supra note 15, at 1364–66; Raz, supra note 
49, at 315–16. Yet if Raz were correct, and this incorporation were conceptually impossible, then the 
Founders necessarily failed in their efforts, and we’d have no difficulty incorporating the wholly source-
based law that they did make. Different positivist theories might conceivably draw different legal 
conclusions from the empirical claims described below, see infra Part III, but we’re not aware of any 
detailed argument to this effect. Cf. Barzun, supra note 15, at 1374 (suggesting that we and Shapiro “make 
more or less the same kind of argument”). In any case, though we’ve maintained that legal systems are 
relatively immune to conceptual arguments about the nature of interpretation, see Sachs, supra note 5, at 
834, we don’t maintain that they’re immune to conceptual arguments about their own nature—contra 
Barzun, supra note 15, at 1365–66. 
 51 Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44, 51 (2016). 
 52 Id. at 51–52. 
 53 Barzun, supra note 15, at 1354, 1357 (citing Greenberg, supra note 1, at 115). 
 54 See infra text accompanying notes 70–73. 
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Hart’s account, in an ultimate rule of recognition, the “complex, but normally 
concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in 
identifying the law by reference to certain criteria.”55 
This hierarchical structure makes it possible for the correct ground-level 
legal rules to surprise us.56 A legal system can tolerate frequent mistakes and 
departures from the law, conflicting claims of legal authority, and even 
universal misunderstandings of what the law happens to require.57 As these 
consequences illustrate, so long as we share certain kinds of premises, a 
positivist approach can still reform our surface-level practices and resolve 
apparent disagreements. In the same way, originalism can be a correct 
descriptive account of our legal system, even if few people would currently 
describe our system that way. 
A. Rules and Inferences 
Grounding legal rules on legal practice doesn’t rule out surprises. Legal 
reasoning is an inferential process that can lead us to surprising results. For 
example, a little time and patience with the statute books will reveal that it’s 
unlawful to send by mail any fruit bats of the genus Pteropus;58 that 
astronauts launching from Cape Canaveral may not sell each other unlabeled 
syrup mixtures or unbaled cotton;59 and that there’s a fifty-square-mile swath 
of Idaho in which one may commit felonies with impunity.60 These can be 
valid rules in our legal system although few legal officials (let alone ordinary 
Americans) know about them or have specific practices along these lines. 
At first glance, legal surprises like these might seem impossible. If law 
is “a set of socially grounded norms,”61 then there can’t be any legal norms 
of which society isn’t aware. But that argument ignores the central 
importance of legal reasoning, which can take us from familiar premises to 
very surprising conclusions. 
On Hart’s view, social rules are more than “regularities” that an external 
observer might “record and predict.”62 They’re things people “use,” from the 
 
 55 HART, supra note 19, at 110. 
 56 See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2253, 2256 (2014). 
 57 See infra Sections II.B–D. 
 58 See 18 U.S.C. § 1716D (2012) (cross-referencing 39 U.S.C. § 3015(a) (2012) (cross-referencing 
18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1) (2012))). 
 59 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(6), 13(a) (2012); FLA. STAT. §§ 865.07–.08 (2018). 
 60 See Brian C. Kalt, The Perfect Crime, 93 GEO. L.J. 675, 677–78 (2005) (discussing U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI and 28 U.S.C. § 131 (2000)). 
 61 Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices 
Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 728 (2006). 
 62 HART, supra note 19, at 89, 98. 
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“internal point of view,” as “standards for the appraisal of their own and 
others’ behaviour.”63 A violation of the rules is not only criticized—using 
terms like “‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘should’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’”64—but this 
“deviation from the standard is generally accepted as a good reason” for the 
criticism.65 As Barzun describes it, the distinction is between recognizing 
merely that “as a rule, men tend to take off their hats when entering church” 
and recognizing “a rule that a man must bare his head in church.”66 Those 
adopting the internal point of view, Hart notes, often employ a “characteristic 
vocabulary,” the way “the expression ‘Out’ or ‘Goal’” is used in baseball or 
soccer: “the language of one assessing a situation by reference to rules which 
he in common with others acknowledges as appropriate for this purpose.”67 
Some of these social rules also give rise to legal ones. Modern societies 
don’t limit themselves to primary rules of conduct, like “don’t steal” or 
“don’t murder.” They also have “secondary rules”—rules about rules, which 
set out how we recognize certain rules, change their contents, or 
authoritatively identify violations.68 For example, a society might hold that 
any rule “found in a written document or carved on some public monument” 
is “a rule of the group[,] to be supported by the social pressure it exerts.”69 
Or we might recognize certain people as lawmakers or judges, with various 
powers to change or apply the law by enacting statutes or hearing cases. By 
combining primary and secondary rules, a society can generate the 
enormously complex hierarchy of norms found in any modern legal system. 
So Hart’s legal rules depend on social practice, but in a complicated and 
indirect way. Legal rules ultimately derive from society’s ultimate “criteria 
for identifying the law”—a “complex, but normally concordant, practice of 
the courts, officials, and private persons.”70 This rule-based practice is not 
only something external observers can see and predict; it’s also something 
people can accept and use from the internal perspective, along with the 
“characteristic vocabulary” that goes with it (e.g., “it is the law that . . . ”).71 
While the “ultimate rule of recognition” is an ordinary social rule, existing 
 
 63 Id. at 98. 
 64 Id. at 57. 
 65 Id. at 55. 
 66 Barzun, supra note 15, at 1344 (emphasis added and omitted) (citing HART, supra note 19, at 10, 
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101 VA. L. REV. 1203 (2015) (criticizing the internal/external distinction, on grounds we do not share). 
 67 HART, supra note 19, at 102. 
 68 Id. at 91–99. 
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only to the extent that it’s actually accepted by actual people,72 the legal rules 
it generates are not. These follow-on rules can exist so long as they are “valid 
given the system’s criteria of validity,” whether or not they’re generally 
accepted as standards in practice.73 
To take a stark historical example, when Congress provided civil law 
for the Territory of Alaska, it did so through a massive feat of incorporation 
by reference, enacting “[t]hat the general laws of the State of Oregon now in 
force are hereby declared to be the law in said district, so far as the same may 
be applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of this act or the laws of 
the United States.”74 Oregon law was apparently selected without regard to 
its substance; the relevant committee picked Oregon over Washington 
without making “any careful study of the laws [of] either,” but simply 
because Oregon’s law seemed “in a more mature and satisfactory shape.”75 
As a result, Alaska’s law was clear in principle—it simply derived from 
Oregon law—but largely mysterious in application. The Attorney General 
soon reported to Congress that he had been unable to distribute statute books 
to territorial officials because of the “[d]ifficulty . . . in obtaining some of the 
necessary copies of these laws.”76 Alaska’s governor complained that the 
Attorney General wouldn’t provide advice about which laws were 
“applicable” and “not in conflict” with federal law.77 One of Alaska’s new 
judges called the Organic Act “a stupendous piece of stupidity.”78 And some 
lawyers even argued that juries had accidentally been made illegal, because 
Oregon law required jurors to be taxpayers, but Congress had not imposed 
taxes in Alaska.79 
 
 72 Id. at 110. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Alaska Organic Act, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 24, 25–26 (1884). 
 75 The chairman of the relevant committee admitted that it had picked Oregon over Washington 
“[n]ot because the committee had made any careful study of the laws either of the state of Oregon or of 
the territory of Washington, but because it was supposed that the Oregon code was in a more mature and 
satisfactory shape.” ERNEST GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA 52 (1954) (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 529 
(1884) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Harrison)); see also 15 CONG. REC. 529 (1884) (noting that “Alaska 
has . . . already been attached to Oregon for some judicial purposes”). 
 76 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 
THE YEAR 1884, at 15 (1884). 
 77 § 7, 23 Stat. at 26; see also A.P. SWINEFORD, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 16 (1885) (“[T]he compilation issued by the late Attorney-General shows 
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 78 Myers v. Swineford, 1 Alaska 10, 12 (1888). 
 79 32 CONG. REC. 1937–38 (1899) (statement of Sen. Thomas Henry Carter) (noting that “[t]he 
difficulty arises in a manner that Senators, without reflection, would not realize”); GRUENING, supra note 
75, at 58. But see Kie v. United States, 27 F. 351, 357 (C.C.D. Or. 1886) (adapting Oregon’s jury-
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Of course, most law isn’t made so haphazardly (thank goodness). Yet 
there’s nothing unique about Alaska that makes these things possible. The 
simplest of secondary rules can generate unusual conclusions. If “whatever’s 
carved on this public monument is law,” we might discover new law 
whenever we dust off a previously overlooked carving. Or if “what the 
Queen in Parliament enacts is law,”80 we might find out that it’s illegal to 
attend Parliament in a suit of armor, because a statute to that effect was duly 
enacted and never repealed.81 Law’s emphasis on legal structure, on the 
official story of legal justification, means that its contents might often 
surprise us. That’s why law can surprise one of two parties to a legal dispute, 
both of whom are represented by well-trained lawyers, by telling them that 
their conduct is not supported by deeper practice. 
B. Mistakes and Departures 
By distinguishing secondary rules from primary rules, Hart’s account 
can also tolerate a certain amount of de facto deviation from the law. Hart 
doesn’t take law to be a mere summary of whatever members of the legal 
community do. Instead, the content of the law depends crucially on the 
reasons they cite for doing it. So it’s perfectly coherent to say (as we have) 
that while originalism is the official story of our legal system, many 
individual cases may turn out to be wrongly decided under that standard.82 
The cases make claims to legal authority that sound in originalism, which is 
what matters for the official story—but “the fact that [they] invoke 
originalism doesn’t show that their specific claims are right, any more than 
a man’s waving a yardstick shows that he is tall.”83 
Some are tempted to say that if the individual cases “are inconsistent 
with the original meaning,” then “[t]o that extent, originalism is not our 
 
qualification rules to Alaska); see also Endleman v. United States, 86 F. 456, 458 (9th Cir. 1898) 
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law.”84 Hart’s account is different. While the “ultimate rule of recognition” 
is a social rule, existing only to the extent that it’s recognized in practice, 
intermediate legal rules—including those entailed by originalism—can be 
said to exist when they are “valid given the system’s criteria of validity,” 
even if they aren’t themselves generally accepted in practice.85 The official 
story persists, though the officials charged with carrying it out are sometimes 
mistaken, bribed, or responding to extralegal pressures. Such cases don’t 
threaten the conventional Hartian framework, for all the reasons that Hart 
argued for privileging the internal acceptance of rules over the purely 
predictive account of the Holmesian “bad man.”86 So long as the rule of 
recognition is generally accepted and its outputs generally obeyed, the 
absence of attention to particular rules does nothing to undermine their 
validity.87 
To take a rather extreme example, suppose that, during the height of Al 
Capone’s reign, his nephew had been sued in another state for a prior traffic 
accident in Cook County, Illinois. The state court, attempting to apply 
Illinois law as lex loci delicti, might have no doubt of how the Illinois courts 
would rule: being afraid of Capone, they’d gin up some way to let the nephew 
off (hopefully without affecting other cases). But Illinois law doesn’t provide 
that the nephew wins, much less establish any general principle that “close 
relatives of Al Capone can do no wrong.” To so maintain would be to confuse 
the external and internal points of view, mistaking the practices that 
correspond to individual legal rules for those that give rise to the ultimate 
rule of recognition. We might recognize that, as a rule, Illinois’s legal 
institutions let Capone relatives off easy, without anyone recognizing a rule 
that they must do so. If no one in Illinois would use the “characteristic 
vocabulary” of the internal perspective (“it is the law that . . . ”) to describe 
the immunities of Capone’s friends and family—if those immunities are 
solely matters of empirical description and prediction—then they’re not legal 
immunities according to Hart. 
Contra Primus, then, a legal critic of the Illinois courts could very well 
argue for different results by “pointing to [their] present practices.”88 That’s 
 
 84 Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1679 n.30 (2018). But see id. (“To 
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because the critic’s “calls for those practices to change”89 are calls, not for 
law reform, but for greater conformity to what Illinois already takes to be its 
law. By contrast, in some societies, it is the law that high-status and low-
status groups are subject to different pains and penalties. (Say, in the Salic 
law’s differential treatment of Franks and Romans or in the notorious Black 
Codes of the defeated Confederacy.90) In other societies, sometimes 
including our own, the law draws no such distinction, even if individual 
officials might. We ought to be able to distinguish these cases accurately. 
Likewise, we ought to be able to understand how the Fifteenth Amendment 
was nullified in practice for decades,91 even while its right against racial 
discrimination in voting was consistently acknowledged as law.92 Even for a 
positivist, it’s far more natural to say that the right was poorly enforced—the 
way that laws against sexual assault often are93—rather than that it silently 
ceased to be law for several decades, before regaining its legal validity 
sometime in the twentieth century. The essence of the internal/external 
distinction is not simply to accept that “[i]t is what the Court has been doing 
that is our law”94—for it matters greatly why a court is doing what it’s doing, 
and what kind of grounds it can cite in support. 
C. Conflicts of Legal Rules 
Hart’s account easily handles occasional mistakes or departures from 
the law. A more complicated case is presented by conflicts among different 
purported legal rules, each of which is generally recognized as having legal 
force. If a D.C. citizen wishes to sue in diversity, for example, most 
American lawyers would say that she may: Congress has legislated in her 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 See, e.g., Oscar Ross Ewing, The New Legal Justice, 24 YALE L.J. 441, 442 (1915) (Franks and 
Romans); CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88, pt. 1, at 110–17 (The Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Devise, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 6, 1971) (Black Codes). 
 91 See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 105–16 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 
17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 308–10 (2000); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification 
for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937, 1939 (1995) (noting that the Amendment 
was “wildly unpopular” (among whites) when it was adopted). 
 92 E.g., REV. STAT. at 32 (2d ed. 1878) (listing the Amendment as part of the Constitution); Giles v. 
Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 166 (1904). While there were occasional arguments that the Amendment itself 
was not law, they were decidedly on the fringe, even during this period. Compare Arthur W. Machen, Jr., 
Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1910) (describing the Amendment as invalid), 
with Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (“That the Fifteenth is valid . . . has been recognized and 
acted on for half a century.”). 
 93 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287,  
1292–99 (2016). 
 94 Primus, supra note 51, at 51–52 (emphasis omitted). 
113:1455 (2019) Grounding Originalism 
1471 
favor,95 the Supreme Court has upheld its action,96 and she has every reason 
to expect future courts to agree. At the same time, there’s a clear sense in 
which diversity jurisdiction is lacking: Article III provides diversity 
jurisdiction for “Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States,”97 
and ancient precedent correctly recognizes that the District isn’t a state.98 So 
which of these positions is actually the law? How could an approach that’s 
grounded in practice ever prefer one to the other? 
These kinds of conflicts can be resolved on perfectly ordinary legal 
grounds—indeed, much the same grounds that, in the previous Section, 
handled the case of mistakes. In modern societies, law is a hierarchical and 
structured normative practice. The lower order, on-the-ground legal rules are 
valid only because the higher order, abstract ones say they are. So if there’s 
a flaw in this process of inference, it’s the lower order conclusion, not the 
higher order premise, that falls. 
In a complex legal system, valid legal rules are usually entailed by 
what’s accepted as a matter of practice, rather than being so accepted 
themselves. A Fish and Wildlife Service permit to import an endangered 
elephant, for example,99 doesn’t carry legal force as a pure matter of social 
practice; it’s only valid (if at all) in light of a series of other legal rules—
published regulations,100 duly enacted statutes,101 the enumerated powers of 
Congress,102 and so on. On Hart’s account, this chain of authority eventually 
terminates in an ultimate rule of recognition, one that requires no further 
legal validation and that’s grounded directly on social facts.103 Properly 
identifying a society’s ultimate rule of recognition means identifying which 
parts of its legal system are not ultimate, which then lets us identify the 
various intermediate rules on which those parts depend. A rule like “arson is 
unlawful” needn’t be accepted as standing “on its own bottom,” so to 
speak;104 it might instead be accepted as a consequence of other, intermediate 
legal rules, such as those concerning the authority of criminal statutes. In 
other words, how rules are taken as law matters at least as much as the fact 
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that they’re so taken: dumping everything into an undifferentiated category 
of “acceptance,” or claiming that every legal rule rests directly on social 
practice, would get the social practices wrong. 
This is why the legal system’s structure of justification is so 
important—not because abstract rules are somehow more special than 
pedestrian ones, but because this structure is built into the rule of recognition, 
which addresses some topics directly and leaves others to be determined only 
by inference. Societies that have different structures of legal justification 
have different laws: a legal world in which elephant import permits require 
no authorization from Congress is a different legal world from one in which 
they do. (Or perhaps more to the point, a legal world in which constitutional 
arguments are expected to have a basis in the original Constitution is 
different from one in which they aren’t.) 
So to return to the D.C. citizen, it’s common in our system for a statute 
to say one thing while the Constitution says another. But another rule of our 
system provides that the Constitution controls. And it’s also common in our 
system for a Supreme Court decision to say one thing while the best reading 
of the legal materials suggests that the decision is wrong. Indeed, “[a]ll 
modern lawyers would understand the distinction that this statement 
draws.”105 
Under our system’s rules of precedent, legal actors are sometimes 
commanded to follow a Supreme Court decision “as if” it were the law—
even as the underlying legal materials, which command ultimate authority, 
prescribe a different result.106 Just as parties to a case can be bound to an 
erroneous judgment by principles of preclusion, requiring them to act in 
future cases “as if” the judgment were accurate, lower courts can be bound 
to an erroneous Supreme Court decision by principles of stare decisis, 
requiring them to treat the decision “as if” it properly stated the law. This “as 
if” law can be binding on particular actors without thereby becoming the 
law107—much the way a runner can be called “out” by an umpire and treated 
as if he were “out” for the remainder of the game, though in truth he actually 
touched the plate first and was safe.108 
So we can say—and indeed we ought to say—that in truth there’s no 
diversity jurisdiction in a case between a citizen of the District and a citizen 
of Virginia. Nor is there diversity jurisdiction in a case between two citizens 
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of Virginia, though one of them may have persuaded an appellate panel that 
he’s really a citizen of New York. In either case, under our law of vertical 
precedent, a district judge is nonetheless bound to act “as if” the appellate 
court’s determination were correct, understanding that any error in that 
determination is to be corrected only on appeal. And when the error is one 
day corrected—and the existing decision revised in favor of the correct 
understanding of the law or facts—then the error will lack even “as if” legal 
force. All of these rules coexist, in a way that most lawyers can understand, 
as part of the structured practice that ultimately defines our law. 
D. Global Error 
On this account of legal structure, we can be surprised by, mistaken 
about, or disobedient toward the law without it ceasing to be law.109 And we 
can sometimes face conflicts between two seemingly valid legal rules, with 
the law itself telling us which rule has the stronger claim.110 As one of us has 
argued at greater length elsewhere, it’s even possible for an entire society to 
be mistaken—to experience “global error” about its law111—if its members 
have thus far overlooked some fact of agreed-on legal significance. This 
possibility may sound odd for a positivist, as ultimately the law is supposed 
to rest on social practice, about which it’s impossible for everyone to be 
wrong. But that social practice includes a process of reasoning and inference 
about which everyone can be wrong—and which actually gets us from social 
rules to legal ones. 
This last step strikes some folks as the thirteenth chime. Not everyone 
agrees that global error is possible for positivists. Nor does everyone agree 
that legal rules can remain in existence despite being overlooked, even 
explicitly rejected, by society and its officials. As Barzun writes, if the rule 
of recognition is a practice of courts and others in identifying the law by 
reference to certain criteria, “[i]t follows . . . that a rule [that] no court applies 
cannot be law.”112 Barzun recognizes that “compliance with a rule is a 
distinct conceptual question from its validity,”113 but he contends that this 
distinction applies only with respect to the compliance “of those people to 
whom this rule has been applied—assuming that judges do apply the rule.”114 
On his reading, jaywalking can still be illegal even though many people 
jaywalk, as courts confronted with a jaywalking case will easily recognize 
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the prohibition. But, he argues, Hart “was not talking about a rule that is 
ineffective because no courts apply it.”115 
We think this is wrong as a matter of exegesis, as well as of 
jurisprudence. Hart is at pains to distinguish “the validity and the ‘efficacy’ 
of law.”116 As he describes it, efficacy is a function of actual obedience, a 
matter of “fact” to be observed or predicted.117 Validity, though, is a matter 
of logical relationships with other rules: “[t]o say that a given rule is valid is 
to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and 
so as a rule of the system.”118 Hart found it “plain that there is no necessary 
connection between the validity of any particular rule and its efficacy”—
unless the rule of recognition just happens so to provide, as in legal systems 
containing rules of desuetude or obsolescence.119 Contra Barzun, a legal rule 
is valid if and only if it passes the tests; a pattern of enforcement is 
unnecessary, judicial or otherwise. 
Our reading of Hart’s distinction between efficacy and validity is 
supported by his similar distinction between the ultimate rule of recognition 
and the subordinate legal rules it recognizes. The rule of recognition is a 
social rule; “[i]ts existence is a matter of fact,”120 to be determined by 
“whether it is the practice of courts, legislatures, officials, or private citizens 
. . . actually to use this rule as an ultimate rule of recognition.”121 As in a 
“simple system of primary rules of obligation,” the “assertion that a given 
rule exist[s]” can only be determined by whether, “as a matter of fact, a given 
mode of behaviour [i]s generally accepted as a standard.”122 But subordinate 
legal rules in a complex system are different: we determine whether they 
exist, not by assessing actual practice, but by applying the rule of recognition 
in a process of legal reasoning.123 “We only need the word ‘validity’ . . . to 
answer questions which arise within a system of rules where the status of a 
rule as a member of the system depends on its satisfying certain criteria 
provided by the rule of recognition.”124 With a rule of recognition added to 
the system, a rule “exists” when it’s “valid given the system’s criteria of 
validity.”125 If the legal community shares an official story of its law, which 
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sets out criteria of validity and a structure of legal justification, then 
ordinarily we can just go ahead and apply those criteria to determine what 
the law is. 
When judges and officials appear to depart from this official story, that 
doesn’t refute its status as law. Rather, these departures are often merely 
evidence of a more complex consensus, in which the acknowledged criteria 
have various implicit or unstated exceptions. For Hart, there’s nothing odd 
about accepted rules being defeasible in this way: “[a] rule that ends with the 
word ‘unless . . . ’ is still a rule.”126 But whatever the criteria of validity may 
be, those criteria are to be applied from the internal point of view, using the 
“characteristic vocabulary” of “it is the law that . . . ,” and so on. So it matters 
greatly whether any purported departures or limitations are actually 
understood and defended as permissible exceptions—as bona fide features 
of the official story, the way “canceled” and “cancelled” are both accepted 
spellings—or whether they’re just ordinary errors or “deviation[s] from the 
standard,”127 in which case the valid legal rule lives on despite them. In the 
latter case, as Greenberg puts it, a rule that lacks consensus in practice may 
still be “validated by a criterion that is itself grounded in such a 
consensus”128—or, in Hart’s words, the rule “may be valid and in that sense 
‘exist’ even if it is generally disregarded.”129 
In Barzun’s favor, Hart does recognize efficacy, in some sense, as a 
precondition of a legal system. If the “rules of the system” as a whole fall 
into “general disregard,” then that system may have “ceased to be the legal 
system of the group.”130 But, Hart cautions, it would “be wrong to say that 
statements of validity ‘mean’ that the system is generally efficacious.”131 
Those who assert a rule’s validity may presuppose a rule of recognition that’s 
“actually accepted and employed in the general operation of the system,”132 
without necessarily asserting this kind of efficacy, much less predicting it—
and especially without predicting the courts’ enforcement of each individual 
rule. 
Indeed, Hart explicitly rejects the view that “to assert the validity of a 
rule is to predict that it will be enforced by courts or some other official 
 
 126 Id. at 139. 
 127 Id. at 55. 
 128 Greenberg, supra note 1, at 115. 
 129 HART, supra note 19, at 110. 
 130 Id. at 103. 
 131 Id. at 104. 
 132 Id. at 108. 
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action taken.”133 Valid rules usually are enforced in that way, but that’s not 
what makes them valid; such a claim “neglect[s] the special character of the 
internal statement and treat[s] it as an external statement about official 
action.”134 A judge’s statement that a legal rule is valid “is an internal 
statement recognizing that the rule satisfies the tests for identifying what is 
to count as law in his court, and constitutes not a prophecy of but part of the 
reason for his decision.”135 That’s why Hart’s Postscript rejects the idea that 
legal rules are “in effect . . . only if [they are] accepted and practised in the 
law-identifying and law-applying operations of the courts”; instead, they’re 
“identifiable as valid legal rules by the criteria provided by the rule of 
recognition,” and they can “exist as legal rules from the moment of their 
enactment before any occasion for their practice has arisen.”136 
So it isn’t really decisive, as the question is sometimes phrased, what a 
judge would really do if presented with a knock-down originalist argument 
for some outlandish legal conclusion. The deep structure of our legal system 
is a question of present law, not a prediction of future behavior. Maybe if 
someone discovered irrefutable evidence that, say, Brown v. Board of 
Education137 couldn’t be justified under the original Fourteenth 
Amendment,138 we’d all decide to deem Brown such a “fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation”139 that it’d remain valid even without any roots 
in the law of 1868. But that would require departing from our currently 
operative legal rules, rather than simply applying their terms.140 Just as law 
isn’t “the prediction of what courts will do when a case arises,” it also isn’t 
“the prediction of what we will do when push comes to shove.”141 
Perhaps Hart is wrong about all this. As noted above,142 he’s a bigger 
target than we are, and he has many abler defenders. But if originalism is 
 
 133 Id. at 104; cf. Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514, 517 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) 
(describing the broader universe of “sanction theories” as “nearly friendless”). 
 134 HART, supra note 19, at 105. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 256. 
 137 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 138 But see McConnell, supra note 91. 
 139 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (Jackson, J.). 
 140 See Baude, supra note 8, at 2380–81 (discussing Brown); Sachs, supra note 56, at 2276–78 
(same). For another example, see William Baude, The Court, or the Constitution?, in MORAL PUZZLES 
AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES: ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY ALEXANDER 260, 270 (Heidi M. Hurd 
ed., 2019) (“There will likely come a time when the conflict between judicial supremacy and the original 
Constitution becomes open and notorious. . . . And if we do pick [judicial supremacy], that will mark a 
fundamental revolution in our constitutional order.”). 
 141 See Sachs, supra note 56, at 2275. 
 142 See supra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
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consistent with the most commonly accepted theory of jurisprudence in the 
American academy, that’s a significant finding on its own. An originalist 
rule can still be a legal rule, even if no court applies it—so long as the legal 
system still recognizes an official story with that result. And so there’s 
nothing impossible or paradoxical about saying that legal practice shows 
originalism to be our law—even if some widely accepted legal practices 
might turn out to be inconsistent with the original Constitution. 
 PRACTICE 
The critiques of original-law originalism discussed above have raised 
deep issues of legal theory, which we have tried our best to address. But in 
our view, the more enduring dispute between us and many of our critics is 
far more banal: it’s a simple empirical disagreement. Maybe our beliefs seem 
odd, not because there’s anything wrong with our legal theory, but simply 
because other readers don’t see how our existing legal practice grounds a 
form of originalism. 
We’ve previously identified this commitment to original law in many 
aspects of our practice. Among other things: 
(1) We treat the Constitution as a legal text, originally enacted in the 
late eighteenth century.143 
(2) This constitutional text regulates the selection of legal officials, 
even when such regulations are unpopular or contrary to 
tradition.144 
(3) Actors in our legal system don’t acknowledge, and indeed reject, 
any official legal breaks or discontinuities from the Founding.145 
(4) We rely on technical domesticating doctrines, themselves rooted in 
preexisting law, to blunt the practical force of novel originalist 
arguments.146 
(5) Original meaning sometimes explicitly prevails over policy 
arguments in constitutional adjudication, but the reverse doesn’t 
seem to be true.147 
(6) Our treatment of precedent makes sense if original sources 
determine the Constitution’s content but not if precedent does.148 
 
 143 Baude, supra note 8, at 2366–67; Sachs, supra note 5, at 872. 
 144 Baude, supra note 8, at 2367–68. 
 145 Sachs, supra note 5, at 864–71. 
 146 Id. at 873–74, 838. 
 147 Baude, supra note 8, at 2374–75. 
 148 Id. at 2375–76; Sachs, supra note 5, at 860–64; see also Green, supra note 2, at 499, 519–23. 
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(7) More generally, there are no clear repudiations of originalism as 
our law in the current canon of Supreme Court cases, even in 
situations where the Justices must have been sorely tempted.149 
We don’t claim that any one of these points is dispositive. But taken 
together, they help guide us toward the “complex, but normally concordant, 
practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by 
reference to certain criteria,” which Hart dubbed our rule of recognition.150 
That practice, we’ve argued, is one that supports original-law originalism. 
A. Pedigree 
Those who’ve seriously addressed this evidence have expressed 
different reasons for doubt. Barzun, for instance, denies that there’s any 
social practice requiring permissible interpretation of the Constitution to find 
a pedigree back to the Founding.151 “The problem with this view,” he writes, 
“is that judicial practice does not require interpretive rules to be validated in 
this way.”152 Instead, Barzun argues: 
[T]here is an obvious alternative explanation for how courts treat interpretive 
rules. What the Court requires is some historical support for its interpretive 
approach in order to prove that it is not making [it] up out of whole cloth. The 
fact that a rule has been around for a long time suggests that it may be 
considered custom. And customary law is authoritative not because its pedigree 
is traceable to a particular validating event but rather because its age and 
endurance over time suggest that it works well or has been broadly accepted. 
Under this quite conventional common law understanding, the Court’s 
“methodological hierarchy” is not just not “explicit.” It is nonexistent.153 
This kind of empirical disagreement is more productive than the 
theoretical ones. But it still proceeds much too quickly, both in weighing the 
evidence and in describing the substance of our law. 
1. Evidence 
In assessing the evidence, Barzun places too much weight on the lack 
of an explicit and complete pedigree in individual judicial opinions, in a way 
that’s disconnected from ordinary norms of citation and opinion-writing. The 
fact that courts don’t always trace their reasoning all the way back to the rule 
 
 149 Baude, supra note 8, at 2376–86; see also William Baude, Adam S. Chilton & Anup Malani, 
Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 54–
57 (2017) (describing the empirical methodology behind this claim). 
 150 HART, supra note 19, at 110. 
 151 Barzun, supra note 15, at 1347–48. 
 152 Id. at 1348. 
 153 Id. at 1349–50 (footnote omitted). 
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of recognition doesn’t mean that there is no rule of recognition animating 
that reasoning; it simply means that we have to look harder and more 
carefully to see if there is one. 
Consider, by analogy, how courts deal with statutes in the American 
legal system. Federal statutes can be found in several different collections of 
books, most importantly in both the Statutes at Large and the United States 
Code. Of these two, the Statutes at Large, and not the U.S. Code, is the more 
legally authoritative source.154 The reason for this is that the Statutes at Large 
contains nearly everything enacted by Congress pursuant to the process laid 
out in Article I.155 The U.S. Code is assembled outside of the lawmaking 
process by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel, a group of unelected 
officials appointed by the Speaker of the House to recompile and reorganize 
the enacted text.156 (Some volumes of the Code are sometimes then enacted 
by Congress and thereby turned into positive law,157 at least until those 
volumes are again amended by new statutes.158) 
If you looked only at the citation practices of the Supreme Court, you 
might well be ignorant of all this. Many opinions addressing federal statutes 
provide citations to the U.S. Code, without in turn tracing those provisions 
back to their exact pedigree in the Statutes at Large, let alone to the 
provisions that empower Congress to enact laws.159 Sometimes, U.S. Code 
citations are even required by rules of court.160 But it would be a mistake to 
conclude from this citation practice that there is no legal hierarchy between 
the Code and the Statutes at Large—or that this citation practice reflects any 
abandonment of the requirements of Article I. 
Rather, one has to look a little harder to discover the true official story 
of federal statutory law. For one thing, the Code and the Statutes themselves 
 
 154 See infra notes 161–166 and accompanying text. 
 155 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Ralph H. Dwan & Ernest R. Feidler, The Federal Statutes—Their 
History and Use, 22 MINN. L. REV. 1008, 1010 (1938). 
 156 2 U.S.C. §§ 285b–285c (2012). See generally Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not 
Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 283 (2007) (distinguishing the Statutes from the Code). 
 157 See OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, POSITIVE LAW CODIFICATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES CODE, http://uscode.house.gov/codification/positive_law_codification.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SYA6-M26U]. 
 158 See Will Baude, Reminder: The United States Code Is Not the Law, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp
/2017/05/15/reminder-the-united-states-code-is-not-the-law [https://perma.cc/Y42U-TFL9]. 
 159 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624, 1627 (2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 102, 
103, 157). 
 160 See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 34.5 (“All references to a provision of federal statutory law should ordinarily 
be cited to the United States Code, if the provision has been codified therein. In the event the provision 
has not been classified to the United States Code, citation should be to the Statutes at Large.”). 
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agree on their relative authority.161 And in the rare cases in which the 
question becomes relevant, legal experts do indeed remember the true 
hierarchy. In U.S. National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents 
of America,162 the Supreme Court considered the validity of the Act of Sept. 
7, 1916, 39 Stat. 753, part of which had been omitted from the U.S. Code for 
over forty years “with a note indicating that Congress had repealed it in 
1918.”163 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the omitted statute was still 
legally operative, construing the repealing act more narrowly than the 
codifiers had—and applying the oft-forgotten rule that the U.S. Code is 
merely “‘prima facie’ evidence that the provision has the force of law,” while 
the Statutes at Large are “legal evidence.”164 Indeed, even the “enacted” titles 
of the U.S. Code, which do enjoy the status of “legal evidence,”165 are 
displaced by subsequent uncodified provisions of the Statutes at Large—for 
example, the provisions governing the appointment of the FBI director.166 
Much of our legal system lacks the formality of the U.S. Code. But this 
example confirms that the first layer of legal citations doesn’t always reflect 
the deep structure of the law. Lawyers and judges use the U.S. Code on a 
daily basis, and often they might forget to double-check the law that lies 
beneath it.167 For the same reasons, lawyers and judges might write 
extensively about the income tax without first reciting the portions of the 
Sixteenth Amendment that authorized it (or the portions of Article V that 
authorize amendments, of Article VII that discuss ratification, etc.).168 The 
hierarchy matters when a relevant question is raised. 
That’s also why lawyers and judges might also cite judicial precedents, 
reason from prevailing doctrine, and so on, instead of beginning every brief 
or opinion with materials that date to the Founding.169 It’s only to be 
 
 161 Compare Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 388, § 112, 61 Stat. 633, 636 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112) 
(“legal evidence”), with id. § 204(a), 61 Stat. at 638 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 204(a)) (“prima facie” 
evidence). 
 162 508 U.S. 439 (1993). 
 163 Id. at 441–42.  
 164 Id. at 448 (citations omitted); cf. id. at 453–63 (addressing a substantive question, irrelevant here, 
of how to read the 1916 Act and 1918 repeal together). 
 165 1 U.S.C. § 204(a). 
 166 See 28 U.S.C. § 532 (2012) (“The Attorney General may appoint a Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.”), abrogated by Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, § 1101, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 532 note) (providing that, starting in 
the 1970s, “the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be appointed by the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate”). 
 167 See Dorsey, supra note 156. 
 168 See United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U.S. 141, 145 (2014); Daniel Hemel & Kyle 
Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 70 TAX L. REV. 667 (2017). 
 169 Cf. Eric Segall, Originalist Judicial Activism, DORF ON LAW (July 12, 2018, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/07/originalist-judicial-activism.html [https://perma.cc/R8KS-N6AV] 
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expected, after two centuries of constitutional litigation, that there’d be past 
decisions on adjacent questions that speak in more granular terms than does 
the constitutional text.170 Originalism doesn’t declare all these other sources 
inadmissible; it simply makes their authority contingent on certain 
factors171—or, to put it another way, it makes them vulnerable to originalist 
refutation.172 What we’re after here is a criterion of validity, not a drafting 
guide. The legal system has rules about which sources of law trump others 
in case of conflict, and both lawyers and judges will recognize as much when 
the question is straightforwardly posed.173 Surface-level citation practices 
don’t tell us all (or even most) of what we want to know about the deep 
structure of law. 
Of course, looking to deep structure carries evidentiary problems of its 
own. Greenberg, for example, finds it simply implausible that there’s a 
sufficiently convergent practice of interpretation to count as law in Hart’s 
sense.174 He correctly recognizes that it is possible for there to be “a 
consensus criterion that points to a legal answer, yet the participants in the 
consensus have failed to notice that their criterion yields that legal answer,” 
for instance because it is “a criterion the application of which is 
controversial.”175 But he argues that it is “harder to see how the relevant legal 
standards could have remained unrecognized.”176 There would have to be “a 
consensus that pointed to a source of law,” yet at the same time some 
“empirical mistake about what that source of law specified, perhaps because 
the source had somehow been lost.”177 Instead, the “most promising type of 
candidate would be a normative one—what democracy requires, for 
example,” and not the kind of legal and historical pedigree to which we 
point.178 
Alas, legal history is hard. It’s hard enough to trace the title of a single 
parcel of land back to legal grants a few centuries old.179 It isn’t surprising 
 
(criticizing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1740–48 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring), in part because “no originalist evidence was presented”). 
 170 See Sachs, supra note 56, at 2292. 
 171 Baude, supra note 8, at 2375–76; Sachs, supra note 5, at 860–64; see Green, supra note 2,  
at 519–23. 
 172 See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 158, 167 (2017). 
 173 See SUP. CT. R. 34.5 (“Additional or alternative citations should be provided only if there is a 
particular reason why those citations are relevant or necessary to the argument.”). 
 174 Greenberg, supra note 1, at 114–18. 
 175 Id. at 117. 
 176 Id. 
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 179 E.g., United States v. Old Dominion Boat Club, 630 F.3d 1039, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (tracing a 
social club’s property back to King Charles I). 
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that tracing the title of every relevant interpretive method might be much 
harder, given that the relevant materials are much vaster and the 
consequences more sweeping. And it also isn’t surprising that disagreement 
might be rampant where the claims of pedigree are often implicit, the 
historical assumptions often unspoken, and, frankly, legal scholarship only 
beginning to offer serious help. In this world, the problem is not so much 
that the Founding-era Codex of Legal Methods of Interpretation has been 
temporarily mislaid but rather that we need to reorient our minds toward 
doing carefully and explicitly what’s often done casually or implicitly. That 
the criteria are imperfectly applied doesn’t mean that they’re absent or even 
imprecise. 
2. Substance 
The relationship of the Code to the Statutes is illuminating in another 
way. It illustrates how the substance of modern law reflects an accumulation 
of certain materials from the past. 
Consider what would be necessary to compile the text of a fully 
complete and correct U.S. Code. It would include everything Congress has 
lawfully enacted since the Founding, with edits to reflect every lawful repeal 
or amendment. Actually setting out that text might involve some hideously 
complex legal judgments—determining the scope of ambiguous repeals,180 
applying the enrolled bill rule,181 and so on. But we’d have no trouble 
articulating what it would look like in principle; nor would we be surprised 
that its present content might depend on the past. 
The same goes for compiling a fully complete and correct text of the 
Constitution. The official story would start with Ratification and go from 
there. We might need to answer some complicated questions about 
subsequent amendments—say, involving Article V’s tacit domain 
restrictions,182 the de facto government doctrine,183 or the doctrine of 
scrivener’s error.184 But the basic idea that we’re supposed to trace 
developments from the Founding isn’t very controversial, even if any actual 
attack on a particular amendment would be. Subsequent amendments are 
officially held to be valid only because they were adopted at a particular time 
and in a particular way.185 
 
 180 See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439 (1993). 
 181 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 182 See Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment: Normative 
Defense and Implications, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, no. 1, 2017, at 167, 175–76. 
 183 See Harrison, supra note 30, at 429–51. 
 184 See United States v. House, 617 F. Supp. 237, 239 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (disregarding 
typographical errors in state resolutions ratifying the Sixteenth Amendment). 
 185 See Sachs, supra note 5, at 868–71. 
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Indeed, if we wanted to compile a fully complete and correct account 
of the entire corpus juris of U.S. law, it might similarly include all the law as 
it stood at the time of the Founding, with adjustments for all the lawful 
alterations and amendments made since. Not all of our law is written, and 
that’s okay; originalism can tolerate a partially unwritten original law. But 
our system does require a certain kind of pedigree, commonly associated 
with written law—as is appropriate for a system with a written Constitution. 
We might argue over the legality of particular alterations or amendments, 
but it’s not hard to see why the project would proceed in chronological order, 
resting today’s law on that of the past. 
This means that much of Barzun’s alternative explanation of our 
practices, that interpretive rules may also derive from a “quite conventional 
common law understanding” of “customary law,”186 is perfectly consistent 
with our view of the original law. Customary law was itself a well-
recognized kind of law at the Founding, and the Founders’ law likely 
included the possibility, within certain fields, of legal “evol[ution] by slow 
accretion.”187 (If the law of the Founding included a customary law of 
admiralty—or indeed a customary general common law—then these fields 
of law remain customary today, unless something was lawfully done to 
change them.) We see such customary fields, together with any limits on 
their potential evolution, as possible contingent implications of our legal 
system’s official story.188 
By contrast, Barzun proposes customary law as an alternative to our 
view, requiring confidence that it would still be compatible with American 
legal norms regardless of whether there had been such law at the Founding—
apparently, even if the modern use of customary law in a given field were 
entirely the product of some mid-century judicial power grab.189 That, we 
think, is a much taller order, at least as judged by our existing legal culture.190 
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B. Pretense 
A different form of skepticism about our empirical account argues that 
we have described not practice but pretense. Professor Mikołaj 
Barczentewicz discusses the prospect of a systematic divergence between 
what our officials say and what they do. Our officials might recite 
originalism while acting in nonoriginalist ways—“publicly avow[ing]” rules 
that “their actions appear to violate”191—resulting in a “systematic practice 
of officials, guided by general rules, which is inconsistent with the ‘official 
story’ of the law that officials sell to the public.”192 As Professor Eric Posner 
once put it, “our political culture . . . happens to require ritual obeisance to 
the founders,” in much the same way that Roman culture required priests to 
examine bird entrails, and with no greater consequences for actual decision-
making.193 If so, originalism might be an empty ritual or noble lie,194 with no 
resemblance to actual legal practice—like the vaunted freedoms of speech 
and press promised by the Soviet Constitution,195 which served only as traps 
for the unwary.196 
We think this scenario would raise deep questions of jurisprudence, 
which one of us has posed before under the moniker of “the Illuminati 
Problem.”197 We intend to answer them in a separate work for the 
jurisprudentially inclined,198 where we will argue that the official public 
story, not the subterranean official practice, would nonetheless control. But 
that’s a topic for another day. We don’t need high theory to answer the charge 
because the hypothetical isn’t posed by our practice. 
Looking at our legal system, the participants don’t seem to treat 
Founding-era law as if it were simply an empty promise like the Soviet 
Constitution, or even a vaunted symbol like the American flag that hangs in 
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each courtroom. Rather, they formulate originalist claims as actual 
arguments: as if they cared about convincing others and not as mere 
ceremony. 
Consider, for instance, the many briefs spent discussing history and 
original meaning in the recent litigation over the Emoluments Clause.199 
Indeed, at one point, an ally of the plaintiffs believed that she had uncovered 
documents in the National Archives refuting the work of a leading originalist 
scholar of the Clause.200 The perceived discovery was widely and excitedly 
discussed because it was thought to address an important argument.201 And 
when the originalist scholar produced extensive documentary evidence and 
expert opinion undermining the discovery’s significance,202 it worked: most 
of those who had challenged him on that particular point reconsidered and 
confessed error,203 even as they continued to press originalist arguments on 
other points. 
This looks to us like a process that takes originalist arguments seriously. 
Clients spend good money hiring lawyers to dig up originalist evidence—the 
stronger the evidence, the better—which is then treated as meaningful even 
by those who rarely describe themselves as originalists.204 This suggests that 
originalism isn’t merely something at which to genuflect before moving on 
to the real grounds of decision, for then the quality of originalist argument 
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wouldn’t matter so much. If originalism is a ritual, it’s a ritual that obeys the 
full form of legal argument. If originalism is a pretense, the pretense runs 
deep. 
Nor does it seem to us a coincidence that both textualist and purposivist 
scholars have attempted to ground their proposed methods in Founding-era 
evidence205 or in the text and structure of the Constitution more generally.206 
Rather, we think the more natural explanation is that our system requires 
legal norms to bear a certain kind of pedigree—often implicit, to be sure,207 
but traceable back to the system’s origins. 
C. Motivated Reasoning 
Alternatively, originalism might be more than a noble lie without fully 
determining official behavior. Primus, for example, argues that “originalist 
argumentation suffers from motivated reasoning more than it suffers from 
purposeful duplicity.”208 On Primus’s account, judges “are liable to misread 
originalist source material in ways congenial to their own preferred 
dispositions of cases,” though they do so “sincerely believ[ing] that their 
actions accord with original meanings.”209 They “feel[] an obligation to show 
fidelity to original meanings—or at least to avoid showing infidelity to 
them—but not an obligation passively to follow original meanings wherever 
they might lead.”210 
In our view, this kind of account (if true) would do more to support 
originalism than to undermine it. Again, originalism is a criterion of validity, 
not a drafting guide or decision procedure. Judges who follow the Founders’ 
law are obliged to make decisions consistent with it. But that doesn’t dictate 
exactly how they go about their decision-making—whether through 
consulting the parties’ arguments, plumbing their own intuitions, pursuing a 
broad reflective equilibrium, reading massive amounts of historical 
materials, or something else. And if social rules really do require conformity 
to a particular official story, then officials’ engaging in sincere but 
“motivated reasoning” when that story conflicts with their other preferences 
is exactly what we should expect. 
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After all, officials routinely engage in motivated reasoning as to 
whether their plans are “legal,” full stop—accepting a lower quality of legal 
argument in their favor than they demand of arguments against them.211 We 
shouldn’t expect any greater commitment to originalism than we do to the 
law in general. Primus repeats Professor Karl Llewellyn’s warning that 
“[w]hat satisfies the conscience lulls the mind”;212 but this motivated 
reasoning is still reasoning, and it still admits the force of originalist 
arguments that might wake us from our dogmatic slumbers.213 So long as 
originalist arguments still carry that force, originalism is still the law. 
D. Alternatives 
We believe we’ve put forward the best account of the official story of 
our constitutional law. But many remain skeptical of our empirical claims, 
so let us regroup. As we noted at the outset, our first core claim is that 
theories of legal interpretation ought to give more emphasis to questions of 
what the law actually is. That claim is independent of our empirical case. So 
even if one rejects our own originalist views, the question remains: What, 
then, is our law? If not originalism, what? 
Positive law provides a lens to judge not only originalism but its 
alternatives. We can’t describe all of those alternatives in this short space, 
let alone presume to refute them. But in examining some of the stronger ones, 
we can see that none of them has made a better claim to be our positive law. 
If a reader has the sense that we haven’t quite bridged the gap between our 
theories and observed constitutional practice, we hope we can at least show 
that our competition must cross comparable gaps. 
For instance, Professor David Strauss has famously proposed that we 
have a common law constitution, one in which “now-established principles” 
achieved canonical status by escaping most people’s notice, avoiding any 
“single decisive moment at which the conflict between the text and the 
principles became too stark to ignore.”214 But as Strauss admits, on his theory 
there’s much that’s puzzling about Americans’ persistent claims to adhere to 
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the original Constitution.215 The persistence of these claims is part of what 
motivates our belief in original-law originalism. 
We also worry that, judged in Hartian terms, Strauss’s claims have more 
plausibility from the external perspective than they do from the internal one. 
For example, Strauss may turn out to be right, as an external and historical 
matter, that “people gradually got accustomed to the idea that there should 
be no established churches in the states and to the steady expansion of the 
franchise,” and that they eventually “read[] those principles back into the 
Constitution.”216 But as an internal account of our system’s legal rules, even 
Strauss recognizes that this whatever-we-get-used-to amendment process is 
rather alien; the common law method is “not [one] we usually associate with 
a written constitution, or indeed with codified law of any kind.”217 
Similarly, Strauss argues that courts are sometimes bound by original 
content, as it’d be “lawless” to disregard rules that a recent amendment was 
understood to adopt (though such disregard, he argues, is “routinely 
accepted” for older amendments).218 But the idea that rules added by 
amendment carry a built-in expiration date, after which it’ll be legal to fudge 
things a little, is something no one in our system would describe as a rule of 
constitutional law. (It does not, for example, seem to have affected the 
Emoluments Clause.) We might all notice the relaxed treatment of older 
rules, but we notice it from an external perspective, as a claim about our legal 
practice rather than of it. That is not how participants in our legal practice 
justify constitutional drift. Indeed, what differentiates original-law 
originalism from pure textualism or strict constructionism is the ability to 
easily account for doctrines of precedent and practice in legal terms. 
A different practice-based theory of “principled positivism” has 
recently been proposed by Professor Mitchell Berman.219 Berman argues that 
our tradition of legal argument rests constitutional claims on certain 
principles, such as “[w]hat the text meant to those who ratified it has great 
force,”220 “[w]hat the Supreme Court has held possesses great legal force,”221 
“[g]overnment must respect the inherent equal dignity of each person within 
its jurisdiction, and must not demean or stigmatize people,”222 “[p]olicy 
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preferences of a majority of the people are to be respected,”223 and many 
more. This makes Berman’s theory a particularly advanced form of 
constitutional pluralism. And unlike most forms of pluralism, Berman’s 
theory is of special interest because it recognizes the need for a legal 
framework, itself supported by practice, for weighing these principles 
against one another. This is necessary to yielding a constitutional law that 
can actually decide cases rather than merely make soup.224 
But the very framework that ascribes particular weights to these 
principles (and that would give “principled positivism” its coherence) makes 
us doubt that this is the most natural account of our official story. We are not 
convinced that our legal practitioners engage in a process that looks like 
weighing, and even if they do, we are not convinced that any particular 
assignment of weights can be derived from our practice. Indeed, such a 
theory would likely require “reject[ing] . . . the Hartian account of law” in 
favor of a novel account of positivist jurisprudence.225 Further treatment of 
Berman’s theory may have to await his and our future work, but these 
empirical and jurisprudential gaps seem large to us. 
Still, we are no more convinced by other forms of constitutional 
pluralism, whether they involve many modalities or even just two (such as 
“originalism, but also precedent, even when the two conflict”). What these 
theories have in common is their claim that originalism is at most only part 
of our law. They therefore raise the question: which part? 
A pluralist theory needs some method of resolving conflicts among its 
various modalities, or else it lacks any coherent “truthmaker.”226 We find 
either option hard to swallow as an account of our legal practice. On the one 
hand, the difficulties in establishing Berman’s principled positivism would 
also apply to any competing pluralist formula. On the other, the claim that 
we simply have no law on the topic seems implausible as well. 
One might be tempted to double down on the latter by simply denying 
that our system actually has any constitutional law, at least as to contested 
Supreme Court cases and the like.227 With no law to govern those decisions, 
as Professor Brian Leiter has suggested, the Court would be more of a 
“super-legislature” of limited jurisdiction—restricted to “issues that are 
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brought before it” and nonetheless “constrained, to some extent, by its past 
decisions and by constitutional and legislative texts.”228 
But if the Supreme Court really is a super-legislature, its members have 
some odd preferences regarding their policy agenda.229 The Justices largely 
control their own docket and calendar. Yet instead of acting like normal 
legislators and addressing salient topics like tax rates or gas prices,230 the 
Justices instead possess an extensive desire to meddle around in federal 
sentencing,231 an outsized and politically unpredictable interest in the details 
of criminal procedure,232 and an abiding fascination with Internet 
pornography.233 (The eminent biologist J.B.S. Haldane, when asked what 
he’d learned through his career of the mind of the Creator, suggested “[a]n 
inordinate fondness for beetles.”234) 
We think there are other reasons why these topics, and not others, are 
thought appropriate for Supreme Court intervention—and that those reasons 
have a great deal to do with the official story of our legal system. And within 
these topics, it’s at least as plausible that our system is one in which the Court 
is legally supposed to do its best to determine the law, and its determinations 
merely seem legislative in hard cases because those are the ones in which no 
knock-down legal arguments can be mounted against either view.235 The no-
law view is not simply the null hypothesis, but another positivist claim that 
must be proved, and that we think has yet to be proven. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe we’ve put forward the best account of the official story of 
constitutional law. But if our case isn’t yet proven, the same positivist 
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premises can be used to judge other competing accounts of constitutional 
law. It takes a theory to beat a theory, in the following sense: either 
originalism is our law, or something else is, or nothing is. To be sure, each 
of the authors discussed above is aware of the possible points, and each has 
his answers. But our point here is just to remind readers that one shouldn’t 
judge positivist originalism in a vacuum. Even if our account requires one to 
make some inferences from the evidence we see to the bigger picture we 
present, we submit that those leaps are smaller than the leaps over text and 
conventional jurisprudence required by our best rivals. 
What makes a method of legal interpretation correct, in our legal 
system, is a multilevel question—one that ultimately depends, at different 
levels, on both modern practice and original law. As we see it, the 
relationship between past and present is this: 
• As a theoretical matter, positivists like us figure out today’s law 
based on today’s social facts. 
• As a contingent, empirical matter, today’s social facts happen to 
incorporate the Founders’ law by reference. 
• As a historical, legal matter, the Founders’ law allowed for various 
kinds of changes, including both formal enactments and the 
incorporation by reference of various kinds of customary law. 
As a result, it’s possible and even common for the law to require one or 
two levels of recursion. A given rule of law may be a function of whatever 
the custom is today, because that’s what the Founders’ law prescribed back 
then, which is what our law tells us to care about today. We believe that this 
system, though occasionally complex, in fact gives the best available account 
of how the law of the modern United States relates to the law of the past. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
